Substitution between domestic and foreign currency loans in Central Europe. Do central banks matter? by Brzoza-Brzezina, Michal et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Substitution between domestic and
foreign currency loans in Central Europe.
Do central banks matter?
Michal Brzoza-Brzezina and Tomasz Chmielewski and
Joanna Niedz´wiedzin´ska
2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6879/
MPRA Paper No. 6879, posted 25. January 2008 19:28 UTC
Substitution between domestic and foreign currency
loans in Central Europe. Do central banks matter?∗
Micha l Brzoza-Brzezina† Tomasz Chmielewski‡
Joanna Niedz´wiedzin´ska§
Abstract
In this paper we ask a question about the impact of monetary policy on total
bank lending in the presence of a developed market for foreign currency denominated
loans and potential substitutability between domestic and foreign currency loans.
Our results, based on a panel of three biggest Central European countries (the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland) confirm the existence of the substitution effect
between these loans. Restrictive monetary policy leads to a decrease in domestic
currency lending but simultaneously accelerates foreign currency denominated loans.
This makes the central bank’s job harder with respect to providing both, monetary
and financial stability.
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Non-technical summary
Following the widespread introduction of Inflation Targeting strategies in many developed
and emerging market countries, the role of monetary and credit aggregates has substan-
tially decreased. Nevertheless, money and credit still matter in monetary policy analyses
of inflation targeters. Assuming therefore that central banks care about credit creation
and may want to influence the volume of lending, we ask the question what impact central
banks have on bank lending in the presence of a developed market for foreign currency
loans. In other words, we think of domestic and foreign currency loans as of close sub-
stitutes and since the domestic central bank affects only the price of one of these goods
(i.e. domestic credit) it may mean that its impact on the total amount of loans granted
is limited.
We analyze empirically domestic and foreign currency loan developments in a panel of
three biggest Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The
common features of those economies include following inflation targeting strategies and
having a substantial share of foreign currency loans in total loans to the private sector.
Our study is not the first approach to credit expansion in Central and Eastern Europe.
The investigated topics included e.g. estimating the equilibrium level of credit-to-GDP
for the new EU Member States together with analysing potential speed of the catching-
up process or assessing the risk of crises related to excessive credit expansion. We have,
however, not come across a study treating explicitly the substitution between domestic
and foreign currency loans, though the issue of limited potential efficiency of monetary
tools as a response to a credit boom related to currency mismatch was noticed in some
of the reviewed papers. On the whole, to our knowledge, the question of substitutabil-
ity between domestic and foreign currency denominated loans and its consequences for
monetary policy has not yet received substantial attention.
Estimates based on a panel of quarterly data for the period 1997–2007 show that
indeed domestic and foreign currency loans are close substitutes in the analysed coun-
tries. Although a rise in domestic interest rates affect negatively, as can be expected,
domestic currency lending, it concurrently encourages credit expansion in foreign cur-
rency. Hence, consumers, facing higher borrowing costs in domestic currency simply turn
to foreign credit. Simulations show that newly created foreign currency loans substitute
a non-negligible part of the value of lost domestic currency loans after a monetary policy
tightening. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between the countries, as the
ratio of newly created foreign to lost domestic currency loans amounts to 5–6% in the
Czech Republic, 15–19% in Poland and 31–39% in Hungary. Moreover, it can be expected
that with the growing share of foreign currency loans (which happens in Hungary and
Poland) this ratio will be increasing.
These results may be worrisome for central banks for a number of reasons. First, sig-
nificant substitutability between domestic and foreign currency loans may impede the
2
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. Second, it may make the one instrument –
two goals problem related to providing price and financial system stability even more diffi-
cult to tackle since foreign currency loans tend to be popular especially among households
that usually do not hedge against exchange rate risk. Finally, increased lending can result
in nonfundamental increases in asset prices which, if suddenly reverted, can negatively
impact on monetary and financial system stability. In the presence of a developed market
for foreign currency loans central banks’ attempts to prevent such outcomes can be even
less effective.
3
1 Introduction
Since the widespread introduction of Inflation Targeting strategies in many developed and
emerging market countries, the role of monetary and credit aggregates has substantially
decreased. Money and credit1 are not treated as intermediate targets anymore and cen-
tral banks, as well as analysts, pay much less attention to their developments than they
used to back in the 1980’s. Still, money and credit matter in monetary policy analysis
of inflation targeters for several reasons. First, credit creation is considered an important
driving vehicle transmitting monetary policy decisions on interest rates to the economy
(e.g. Mishkin (1996), Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). Second, it has been shown in many
countries that developments in monetary and credit aggregates can yield useful informa-
tion about future real and nominal developments (Borio and Filardo (2004), Fisher et
al. (2006), Gerlach and Svensson (2003)). Third, it has been recently argued that credit
creation can be useful in assessing the overall created liquidity, even if, in the short and
medium run, it does not affect consumer prices. This liquidity, it is argued, flows to capital
or real estate markets, where it can generate price bubbles. These bubbles can threaten
financial system and price stability in the future. As a result, inflation targeting central
banks pay attention to money and credit developments, treating them as one of the inputs
to their monetary policy decision making process.
In this paper we do not attempt to prove the usefulness of credit aggregates for mon-
etary policy. Assuming that the analysed central banks care about credit creation2 and
may want to curb (or boost) lending, we ask the question what impact central banks have
on bank lending in the presence of a developed market for foreign currency loans. In other
words, we think of domestic and foreign currency loans as of close substitutes. Since the
domestic central bank affects only the price of one of these goods (i.e. domestic credit)
its impact on the total amount of loans granted can be small.
We analyse empirically domestic and foreign currency loan3 developments in a panel
of three biggest Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
All these countries follow inflation targeting strategies and all have a substantial share
of foreign currency loans in total loans to the private sector. Our study is not the first
approach to credit expansion in Central and Eastern Europe. The investigated topics
included e.g. estimating equilibrium level of credit-to-GDP for the new EU Member States
and potential speed of the catching-up process, the possible impact of future euro adoption
on the credit market developments in accession countries and the risk of crises related to
excessive credit expansion. We have, however, not come across a study treating explicitly
1Throughout the paper the terms “loans”and “credit”will be used interchangeably.
2This can be seen for instance from their Inflation Reports, Financial Stability Reports and minutes
of MPC meetings, e.g. CNB (2006), MNB (2006), NBP(2007).
3The notion of foreign currency loans is understood here broadly – as including foreign currency
denominated loans (that can be, technically, paid and repaid in a local currency after indexing any cash
flows to changes in an exchange rate).
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the substitution between domestic and foreign currency loans. Nevertheless, the reviewed
papers point at problems related to rapid credit expansion and at risk associated with
high share of foreign currency loans and thus will be briefly discussed below.
Several studies on rapid credit growth in Central and Eastern Europe discussed the
risk to stability. The reason for this is that credit expansion is often included in a set
of early warning indicators for banking distress. It should be, however, stressed that the
majority of lending booms has not led to banking sector/balance of payments crises in
the region4.
The paper by Boissay et al. (2005) reviews a broad set of countries of the region
(Croatia together with ten transition countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe that
joined EU in 2004 and in 2007). The authors assess credit growth – especially in coun-
tries with fixed exchange rate regimes – as higher than justified by the factors related to
macroeconomic fundamentals and catching-up process5. The study by Backe´ et al. (2006)
concentrates on equilibrium levels of credit-to-GDP ratios in the same sample of 11 transi-
tion economies. Taking into account the estimated corridor of deviation from equilibrium,
the authors find that most of the reviewed countries6 may have already come close to
equilibrium by 2004 or even overshot it. In case of the biggest economies of the region
(the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary) they were rather on the undershooting side al-
though the upper edge of the estimated band was close to the equilibrium level. Identifying
cases of credit boom in Central and Eastern Europe motivated also the study by Kiss et al.
(2006). The authors distinguish different definitions of excessive credit expansion (based
on levels and growth rates) leading to different conclusions. On the one hand, considering
credit-to-GDP ratios for economies under review, currently observed values seemed to be
below levels justified by macroeconomic factors. On the other hand, assessment of credit
growth brings about a mixed picture with Latvia and Estonia considered as potentially
the most risky7. Other studies assess the risk associated with current credit expansions as
not being a major cause for concern. Sirtaine and Skamnelos (2007) come to a conclusion
that still, in the short term, the risk of an adjustment coming form a macroeconomic
shock in Central and Eastern Europe is higher that the risk of deterioration originating
from the banking crisis related to rapid credit growth.
Commenting the results of their studies, several of the cited authors (e.g. Kiss et al.
(2006), Sirtaine and Skamnelos (2007)) marked that the high share of foreign currency
denominated loans in private sector borrowing may be an additional concern for monetary
4The link between credit expansion and banking sector/balance of payments crises has been broadly
discussed in the literature, although without leading to a generally accepted conclusion. A short overview
on the empirical literature on that issue can be found in Brzoza-Brzezina (2005).
5According to Boissay et al. (2005) estimates the most excessive credit growth over the period 2001–
2004 was recorded in: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia followed by Croatia and Hungary.
6Those include primarily: Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria.
7According to Kiss et al. (2006), in Hungary the dynamics of credit expansion can be explained by
the convergence process. The Czech Republic and Poland were described as economies with no excessive
credit growth.
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policy in some countries, since monetary tightening may rather lead to increased foreign
currency indebtedness than to credit growth slowdown. The issue of limited potential effi-
ciency of monetary tools as a response to a credit boom related to currency mismatch was
also noticed in other studies, e.g. in Hilbers et al. (2006) and Backe´ and Wo´jcik (2006),
although it was never the main point of interest. A more explicit discussion on domestic
and foreign currency lending can be found in a paper on the bank lending channel in
Hungary by Horva´th et al. (2006). The findings presented there seem to support the exis-
tence of a substitution effect between the two types of credit, though it must be stressed
that the analysis was concentrated on the supply side of the market8. A similar study
was conducted on monetary transmission in Poland by Wro´bel and Paw lowska (2002).
Analysing responses of private sector credit to monetary policy shocks, the authors for-
mulated a hypothesis that their results may also point to a presence of the substitution
effect. On the whole, the question of substitutability between domestic and foreign cur-
rency denominated loans and its consequences for monetary policy has been signalled
in several studies, however, as a main research topic it has not yet received substantial
attention.
We show that indeed domestic and foreign currency loans are close substitutes in the
analysed countries (i.e. in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). Although domestic
interest rates affect negatively, as can be expected, domestic currency loans, they also
affect positively foreign currency loans. Hence, consumers, facing higher borrowing costs in
domestic currency simply turn to foreign credit. Our estimates show that foreign currency
loans substitute a non-negligible part of the value of lost domestic currency loans after
a monetary policy tightening. Although the results vary somewhat between models and
countries, they point to the phenomenon that might pose a serious constraint on the
ability of domestic monetary authorities to affect overall credit creation. The general
result pointing at the substitution between domestic and foreign currency denominated
loans is robust with respect to the model specification.
2 Model and data
Loan developments are difficult to model empirically. One reason is that we do not have
a consistent economic theory about the determinants of loans. Standard microfounded
models used for monetary policy analysis (e.g. Clarida et al. (1999), Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998), Woodford (2003)) do not show any explicit role for loans. For this
reason it is not fully obvious what variables should enter a model explaining loan demand.
Moreover, recent advances in the analysis of monetary transmission (Bernanke and Blinder
(1988), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000)) show that the loan market is relatively specific in
8The authors investigated whether there is an asymmetric adjustment of bank loan supply to changes
in interest rate, conditioned on specific characteristic of individual banks. They used panel data on
Hungarian banks and followed Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000).
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the sense that we can expect loan demand and loan supply diverging frequently. In such
a situation the observed quantity of new loans is a nonlinear (min) function of demand
and supply. Such problems are relatively difficult to model empirically, in particular in
the presence of short time series and uncertainty about the true data generating process9.
For the above mentioned reasons we decided to follow the approach used relatively
often in the empirical literature. As to the choice of the model, this approach ignores the
possible supply-demand disequilibria, assuming that in the long run the two market sides
must be equal. Since, on the aggregate level it is difficult to identify supply side factors,
this approach to modelling concentrates on the demand side of the market. Regarding
potential determinants of loan demand, the standard approach accentuates primarily in-
come (as measured by GDP) and the cost of borrowing (as measured by the real interest
rate). Despite its limited theoretical appeal this approach has been successfully used for
modelling loan demand in developed and developing countries (Calza et al. (2001), Calza
et al. (2003), Hoffman (2001), Brzoza-Brzezina (2005)).
Our approach differs slightly from the one presented above because of the specific
question we ask. Analysing substitutability between domestic and foreign currency loans
we recognise that demand for any of these products can depend not only on its own price
but also on the price of the potential substitute. Hence, modelling (real) demand for both,
domestic and foreign currency loans we refer to the same set of explanatory variables: real
income, the real cost of borrowing in domestic currency and the real cost of borrowing in
foreign currency:
LD = f(Y, rD, rF , e) (1)
LF = f(Y, rD, rF , e) (2)
where LD and LF stand respectively for real domestic and foreign currency loans, Y
denotes real GDP, rD denotes the real domestic interest rate, rF denotes the real foreign
interest rate and e stands for the nominal exchange rate10.
It should be noticed that the real cost of borrowing in foreign currency, from the point
of view of a resident, involves the nominal foreign interest rate deflated by (expected)
domestic inflation and the expected change in the nominal exchange rate. Since we do
not have consistent data on borrowers’ expectations regarding inflation and the exchange
rate, we deflate the interest rates with current domestic inflation and add the current
exchange rate (or its growth rate, depending on the econometric approach) as a proxy for
future expectations about the exchange rate.
9One possible approach is based on the disequilibrium modelling technique developed by Nelson and
Maddala (1974). It has recently been applied to modelling lending to enterprises in the UK (Atanasova and
Wilson (2004)) and analysing the Polish loan market (Hurlin and Kierzenkowski (2002)). However, our
experience with this estimator based on simulations, was rather negative. The proper estimation required
not only much longer data series that were available to us, but also a specification of the estimated
equations perfectly matching the data generating processes.
10An increase in e means a depreciation of the local currency.
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As already stated, the analysis investigates credit developments in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland. Since there was no unified database with all necessary time series,
the data has been collected from different sources (see Appendix 1). We use a panel of
quarterly data for the period 1997Q1–2007Q1.
Endogenous variables have been defined as real loans to the private sector11 denomi-
nated either in domestic or in foreign currency12 (deflated in each case with the domestic
GDP deflator). The calculations were based on average quarterly stocks of credit, only in
the case of Hungary end of period stock was used (due to lack of monthly data).
Explanatory variables included GDP at market prices of the previous year, domestic
and foreign real interest rates (quarterly averages of 3 month fixing interbank rates deflated
with domestic GDP deflators) as well as Swiss Franc nominal exchange rates against
national currencies (quarterly averages).
As for the foreign interest rate, we decided to use the Swiss Franc LIBOR 3M rate
as a measure of nominal cost of foreign credit. The reason for that is the dominant share
of Swiss Franc loans in total credit in Hungary and Poland. Although Euro is also an
important currency in foreign indebtedness of the analysed countries, the Swiss interest
rates can be well viewed as a proxy for the overall cost of foreign credit, since the two
interest rates and exchange rates13 (Swiss Franc and Euro) move closely together. The
lack of data on detailed structure of foreign loans makes it impossible to use a weighted
interest rate.
All variables were first tested for the order of integration (see Appendix 2). The tests
pointed relatively unambiguously to a unit root in the GDP series and stationarity of
real interest rates, which is consistent with several external studies (e.g. Shively (2001),
Carpolare and Grier (2000)). The case with nominal exchange rates was not clear-cut,
however, since in the countries under review an appreciation trend of real exchange rate
can be observed (due to the catching-up process), we decided to treat the exchange rate
as a variable integrated of order one.
3 Results
Since the theory gives us only weak guidance, a number of alternative empirical specifica-
tions of equations 1 and 2 have been tried in order to check the robustness of the results.
11Private sector is defined as corporations and households. Non-profit institutions serving households
are often treated jointly with households but to ensure the comparability of time series across analysed
countries (the data for those institutions was not available for the whole sample period for all countries)
we excluded them from our definition of the private sector. However, taking into account the minor share
of loans to non-profit institutions serving households, the results should not be affected by that decision.
12Foreign currency credit included jointly all loans denominated in foreign currency (i.e. Euro, Swiss
Frank etc.) but the value was expressed in units of domestic currencies.
13The correlation coefficient of Swiss Franc and Euro interest rates is above 95% (for the period of
1998Q4–2007Q2) and the correlation between exchange rates of domestic currencies (Koruna, Forint and
Zloty) against Swiss Franc and Euro ranges between 92% and 97% for the same period. The use of Euro
exchange rate does not change significantly the results of the analysis.
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Fortunately, the relevant conclusions are invariant to the specification chosen.
In our data set we have both stationary and non-stationary variables. In particular,
our dependent variables LDT (total loans denominated in domestic currency) and LFT
(total foreign currency loans) are I(1). Therefore, in all the specifications the dependent
variable is a quarter-on-quarter growth rate (i.e. change in log-level) of either real domestic
currency loans or real foreign currency loans. Since there is always a considerable time
lag between a decision to apply for a loan and the moment of actual granting the loan
by a bank, we decided that all the variables enter the estimated equations with the lag
of at least one quarter14. In addition, having in mind relatively short time dimension
of our sample, we targeted at reasonably parsimonious specifications. Some experiments
with data proved that it is enough to include at most two lags to achieve well-behaving
residuals. The number of lags of the dependent variable was kept as low as necessary to
just eliminate the autocorrelation in residuals.
As to explanatory variables, we used lagged levels of domestic (rd) and foreign cur-
rency (rchf) interest rates – following the discussion presented in the previous section.
Further, we included rates of changes (i.e. differences of log-levels) for those variables that,
according to earlier tests, might exhibit non-stationarity (i.e. exchange rates – e – and
GDP ). Such an approach allows us to interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities
or (in the case of interest rates) semi-elasticities.
As already mentioned, we used different empirical specifications to check the robust-
ness of the results. We started with an error correction specification with the cointegrating
vestor estimated for our nonstationary variables. Next, we moved to a simple ADL model
on stationary (differenced when necessary) variables and estimated the two equations15
jointly using the SUR estimator. Finally, we took the same approach (ADL), but estimated
the equations separately using the Arellano-Bond estimator.
For the sake of completeness, for each of these empirical specifications we present
the results based on three approaches to the models’ dynamic structure. First, we report
the results of the estimations where all the exogenous variables enter only as first lags.
Second, we use first two lags of all exogenous variables. Finally, we show the results of
a general-to-specific approach – we start with first two lags of all the variables and than
successively drop the variables with insignificant parameter estimates until all variables
are significant at the 10% level.
Given the main question asked in the paper, the parameters for both domestic and for-
eign interest rates are of the primary interest. In what follows our discussion concentrates
on interest rate semi-elasticities. However, we consider our specification to be controlling
reasonably well for other relevant effects so no serious biases should be expected in the
estimated coefficients. In what follows we present the three different empirical specifica-
tions. Since the conclusions are consistent across specifications, we present them jointly
14In our sample it is confirmed by the data – once we tried to estimate specifications without the lagged
dependent variables on the right hand side, the residuals exhibited strong autocorrelation.
15For domestic and foreign currency denominated loans.
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afterwards.
We start with the error correction specification. The results of the panel order of
integration tests (see Appendix 2) led us to the conclusion that the real domestic and
foreign currency lending, the real GDP and the exchange rates (all variables in log-levels,
according to definitions presented in Appendix 1) are integrated of order one. As a natural
next step we tested for possibility of the cointegration (again – in a panel setting) between
these variables16. Although we deal with relatively short time series, the results presented
in Table 2 suggest a possibility of the existence of a cointegrating vector. In the most
general setting, the estimated equations of the error correction model for the country i
and period t is:
∆LDTit = κ
D
i +
3∑
k=1
αDi ∆LDTit−k +
2∑
k=1
βDk ∆GDPit−k +
2∑
k=1
γDk ∆eit−k +
2∑
k=1
λDk rdit−k +
2∑
k=1
θDk rchfit−k + δ
DECTDit−1 + ε
D
it (3)
∆LFTit = κ
F
i +
3∑
k=1
αFi ∆LFTit−k +
2∑
k=1
βFk ∆GDPit−k +
2∑
k=1
γFk ∆eit−k +
2∑
k=1
λFk rdit−k +
2∑
k=1
θFk rchfit−k + δ
FECT Fit−1 + ε
F
it (4)
The evidence for the statistical significance of the error correction term is somewhat
mixed (see Table 3). Moreover, due to the short time span of the data available to the
analysed countries it might be claimed that the results of cointegration analysis could
be misleading17. Therefore, we decided to try also specifications assuming lack of the
cointegrating relationship, where the ECT was not included (i.e. the coefficients δD and
δF are constrained to 0).
Accordingly, furter results are based on the assumption that there is no cointegrating
relationship between potentially non-stationary variables. This means that our specifica-
tion reduces to a distributed lag model:
∆LDTit = κ
D
i +
3∑
k=1
αDi ∆LDTit−k +
2∑
k=1
βDk ∆GDPit−k +
2∑
k=1
γDk ∆eit−k +
2∑
k=1
λDk rdit−k +
2∑
k=1
θDk rchfit−k + ε
D
it (5)
∆LFTit = κ
F
i +
3∑
k=1
αFi ∆LFTit−k +
2∑
k=1
βFk ∆GDPit−k +
2∑
k=1
γFk ∆eit−k +
16We used FM OLS procedure proposed by Pedroni (2000) since it allows some cross-sectional hetero-
geneity.
17Among other problems, there is an issue of only partial coverage of the business cycle.
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2∑
k=1
λFk rdit−k +
2∑
k=1
θFk rchfit−k + ε
F
it (6)
Equations 5 and 6 were subject to two estimation procedures. First, they were esti-
mated jointly using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach (Table 4). Second,
we estimate them separately, using the Arellano-Bond estimator (Table 5). The former
approach was motivated by the fact that, as we discussed in the previous section, equa-
tions 1 and 2 are dependent. Given no constraints on the supply side of the credit market,
a potential borrower faces a joint decision – whether to apply for a loan (given current
and expected economic conditions) and if so – in which currency the loan should be de-
nominated. Therefore, the shocks in equations 1 and 2 could be dependent18. In order to
benefit from this potential relationship, we estimated jointly equations for domestic and
foreign currency loans using the SUR approach. Second, as a robustness check, we also
report the results of the separate estimations for the both types of loans. In this case,
given the dynamic nature of our panel models, we use the Arellano-Bond (1991) first-step
estimator.
The most important conclusions, robust across all specifications and estimation meth-
ods, are as follows. First, the autoregressive feature of credit time series (for both do-
mestic and foreign currency lending) is confirmed by estimation results, since the lagged
dependent variable enters the equations usually with a statistically significant parameter.
Second, estimates of the parameters for the GDP and interest rates have proper signs. An
increase in economic activity results in more of both domestic and foreign currency lend-
ing. A higher domestic or foreign interest rate leads to a lower increase in lending in the
respective currency – the effect of a higher borrowing cost. Third, changes in the foreign
exchange rate seem to have no effect on domestic currency lending. What is interesting,
however, is its impact on foreign currency loans. The estimation results consistently show
that a depreciation of the domestic currency leads to a slower increase in foreign currency
lending (an appreciation results in more foreign currency lending). If this last result is
driven mostly by the demand factors (and anecdotal evidence from Poland supports this
hypothesis) then behaviour of potential borrowers might not be fully rational19.
Our main finding, however, is that the domestic monetary policy might be counter-
productive in the case of a lending boom fuelled by foreign currency denominated loans.
We obtained very strong (and consistent across different specifications and estimation
methods) evidence that an increase in the domestic interest rate results is more foreign
currency denominated loans. Therefore, a monetary contraction, instead of curbing credit
growth, leads rather to changes in currency composition of new loans.
The presented models convincingly show that domestic monetary policy acts (to some
18For example, a deterioration in the general economic outlook should have a negative effect both on
new domestic and foreign currency denominated lending.
19This is true if we assume that the exchange rate is non-stationary due to the real appreciation trend,
as well as, if we assume that the exchange rate is mean-reverting.
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extent) in a counterproductive way. However, given their simple structure they are not
capable in answering the question about the magnitude of the substitution effect. This
is because any simulation of domestic and foreign credit reaction to an interest rate
shock conducted on their basis would be prone to the criticism that it does not take
into account the indirect effects on loans via exchange rate or output reaction. For this
reason we decided to run also a panel VAR20 on our data set and analyze the impulse
responses of domestic and foreign currency loans to a domestic interest rate shock. The
estimated VAR seems to reflect the basic features of the previously estimated models,
i.a. the negative reaction of domestic loans and the positive reaction of foreign loans to a
domestic interest rate shock. The substitution effect has been calculated by dividing newly
created foreign currency loans by destroyed domestic currency loans after 16 quarters from
the initial domestic interest rate shock21. We report the results for VARs with 1 and 2
lags in Table 122.
the Czech Republic Hungary Poland
VAR(1) 6% 39% 19%
VAR(2) 5% 31% 15%
Table 1: Estimates of the substitution effect
The results are dispersed between countries which results directly from the different
share of foreign currency loans in total loans, ranging from 11% in the Czech Republic to
45% in Hungary in 2007Q1. Consequently, the substitution effect in the Czech Republic
may be considered negligible. However its magnitude in Poland and, in particular, in Hun-
gary cannot be ignored by policymakers, in particular taking into account the continously
growing share of foreign currency loans in these countries. Given the simple approach
these results should be interpreted with caution. Still, we believe that they document
quite robustly not only the presence but also the nonnegligible size of the substitution
effect in the region.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we asked the question what is the impact of monetary policy on total bank
lending in the presence of a developed market for foreign currency denominated loans. The
relevance of this question is motivated by the potentially high substitutability between
domestic and foreign currency loans. Since the central bank has only impact on the cost of
borrowing in domestic currency it cannot prevent lending in foreign currency and hence,
may have only limited impact on total lending.
20We used the codes developed by Zicchino and Love (2006).
21This was based on the most recent available observation of loan amounts outstanding for each country
separately.
22Complete results from the VAR study can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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We based our empirical analysis on a panel of three biggest Central European coun-
tries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The obtained results confirm that devel-
opment of the market for foreign currency loans makes the job of the central bank more
difficult. Although, as can be expected, a monetary tightening leads to a decrease in do-
mestic currency lending, it has simultaneously an accelerating effect on foreign currency
denominated loans. Therefore, instead of curbing credit growth, the central bank might
rather end up changing the currency composition of new bank lending. Simulating the
magnitude of the substitution effect shows a nonnegligible substitution between domestic
and foreign currency loans in Poland and Hungary. Given the increasing share of foreign
currency loans in these countries, this problem may worsen over time.
These results may be unpleasant for central banks for a number of reasons. First,
significant substitutability between domestic and foreign currency loans may negatively
impact upon the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. Second, the popularity of
foreign currency loans may make the “one instrument, two goals”problem related to pro-
viding price and financial system stability even more difficult to tackle. Foreign currency
loans tend to be popular especially among households that usually do not hedge against
exchange rate risk. If restrictive monetary policy accelerates foreign currency lending then
it leads to more risk present in the households’ balance sheets. Finally, as suggested in
the literature, increased lending can result in nonfundamental increases in asset prices
which, if suddenly reverted, can negatively impact on monetary and financial system sta-
bility. High substitution between domestic and foreign currency denominated loans makes
central banks’ attempts to prevent such outcomes even less effective.
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A Appendix 1: Data sources
The following sources of data for the econometric model were used:
1. Loans to the private sector:
• Loans denominated in domestic currency (i.e. Czech Koruna) to the private sec-
tor (households + non-financial corporations) in the Czech Republic – source:
Czech National Bank (CZK millions)
• Loans denominated in domestic currency (i.e. Hungarian Forint) to the private
sector (households + non-financial corporations) in Hungary – source: National
Bank of Hungary (HUF billions)
• Loans denominated in domestic currency (i.e. Polish Zloty) to the private sector
(households + non-financial corporations) in Poland – source: National Bank
of Poland (PLN millions)
• Loans denominated in foreign currency (all currencies other than domestic
currency) to the private sector (households + non-financial corporations) in
the Czech Republic – source: Czech National Bank (CZK millions)
• Loans denominated in foreign currency (all currencies other than domestic
currency) to the private sector (households + non-financial corporations) in
Hungary – source: National Bank of Hungary (HUF billions)
• Loans denominated in foreign currency (all currencies other than domestic
currency) to the private sector (households + non-financial corporations) in
Poland – source: National Bank of Poland (PLN millions)
2. GDP at market prices of 2000 (Millions of national currency – i.e. Czech Koruna,
Hungarian Forint and Polish Zloty respectively)
• the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland – source: Eurostat
3. GDP deflator (prices of the previous year = 100)
• the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland – own calculations based on Eurostat
data
4. Nominal interest rate – Interbank Rates (3 Month, Fixing)
• the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Switzerland – source: EcoWin
5. Nominal exchange rate – Swiss Franc exchange rates against national currency
• the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland – own calculations based on EcoWin
data
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3. Poland  
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Appendix 2: Panel unit root tests  
Real domestic currency loans  
log-levels  
Real domestic currency loans  
first differences 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.528 0.299  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.116 0.001 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  1.037 0.850  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.431 0.000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 2.485 0.870  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 25.820 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 1.981 0.922  PP - Fisher Chi-square 30.760 0.000 
Exogenous variables: None  Exogenous variables: None 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 2.635 0.996  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.099 0.001 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.904 0.989  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 16.074 0.013 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.988 0.986  PP - Fisher Chi-square 31.689 0.000 
       
       
Real foreign currency loans  
log-levels  
Real foreign currency loans  
first differences 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.993 0.160  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.874 0.000 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  0.623 0.734  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.419 0.000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 7.555 0.273  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 38.541 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 4.704 0.582  PP - Fisher Chi-square 38.961 0.000 
          
Exogenous variables: None  Exogenous variables: None 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 1.891 0.971  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.286 0.000 
       
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process) 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 3.114 0.794  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 34.949 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 1.895 0.929  PP - Fisher Chi-square 42.380 0.000 
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Real GDP  
log-levels    
Real GDP  
first differences   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 5  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.514 0.304  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.587 0.005 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  2.479 0.993  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.074 0.001 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 4.934 0.552  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 20.142 0.003 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 5.932 0.431  PP - Fisher Chi-square 13.443 0.037 
Exogenous variables: None  Exogenous variables: None 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 1 to 3  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 4.003 1.000  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.163 0.122 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 0.006 1.000  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 7.221 0.301 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 0.001 1.000  PP - Fisher Chi-square 6.519 0.368 
       
       
       
Exchange rate  
log-levels  
Exchange rate  
first differences 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects  Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.502 0.006  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -7.966 0.000 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.671 0.047  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.329 0.000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 19.130 0.004  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 55.580 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 24.466 0.000  PP - Fisher Chi-square 58.093 0.000 
          
Exogenous variables: None  Exogenous variables: None 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0  Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 
       
Method Statistic Prob.#  Method Statistic Prob.#
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)   Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 0.911 0.819  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -8.832 0.000 
       
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root 
process) 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 2.413 0.878  ADF - Fisher Chi-square 78.886 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 2.365 0.883  PP - Fisher Chi-square 79.136 0.000 
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Real domestic interest rates  
levels  
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
   
Method Statistic Prob.# 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.084 0.019 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.177 0.015 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 18.316 0.006 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 6.265 0.394 
Exogenous variables: None   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1 
   
Method Statistic Prob.# 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.532 0.000 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 27.370 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 10.611 0.101 
 
 
Real foreign interest rates  
levels   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 1 to 5 
   
Method Statistic Prob.# 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.900 0.002 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.269 0.012 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 15.525 0.017 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 9.018 0.173 
Exogenous variables: None   
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 1 to 5 
   
Method Statistic Prob.# 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.196 0.000 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 25.091 0.000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 30.837 0.000 
 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel       
Automatic selection of maximum lags         
# Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
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Appendix 3: Estimation Results 
 
[std. errors]        
 (p-values)         
{t-statistics}  
(1), (4) – First lags of all exogenous variables      
(2), (5) – First two lags of all exogenous variables     
(3), (6) – General-to-specific, starting with specification with first two lags of all exogenous variables  
Sargan - Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions
Arellano-Bond (1) - Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: H0: no 
autocorrelation 
Arellano-Bond (2) - Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:  H0: no 
autocorrelation 
 
Table 2. Panel group FMOLS results  
 
Cointegrating Eq:  ECTD ECTF
LDTt-1 1.00   
LFTt-1   1.00  
GDP t-1 -0.40 -0.68  
  {15.53} {10.44}  
e t-1 1.39 1.13  
  {-2.53} {0.15}  
_cons -4.74 1.48  
Cointegration   Null: Unit root 
group rho-stat     2.06**     1.78* 
group pp-stat     2.48**     2.02**  
group adf-stat     2.22**     1.40***  
   
##All reported values are distributed N(0,1)
Panel stats are weighted by long run variances  
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Table 3 – Estimation results using Arellano-Bond estimator, specification with ECT 
 
First lags of all 
exogenous variables 
First two lags of all 
exogenous variables General-to-specific 
  (1) (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) 
  ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT 
ΔLDTt-1 0.384***  0.369*** 0.369***
  [0.096]  [0.099]  [0.093]  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ΔLDTt-2 0.042  0.067  0.063  
 [0.104]  [0.106]  [0.098]  
  (0.688)   (0.535)   (0.522)   
ΔLDTt-3 0.212**  0.234**  0.238***  
  [0.092]  [0.098]  [0.090]  
  (0.022)   (0.017)   (0.008)   
ΔLFT t-1  0.493***  0.253**   0.468*** 
   [0.093]  [0.102]   [0.091] 
    (0.000)   (0.013)   (0.000) 
ΔLFT t-2    0.316***    
     [0.095]    
        (0.001)     
ΔGDP t-1 0.512 -0.736 0.561 -1.459    
  [0.667] [1.25] [0.908] [1.658]    
  (0.443) (0.556) (0.537) (0.379)     
ΔGDP t-2   -0.134 2.254    
    [0.851] [1.552]    
      (0.875) (0.146)     
Δe t-1 0.032 -0.625*** 0.015 -0.598***   -0.579*** 
  [0.078] [0.170] [0.080] [0.159]   [0.160] 
  (0.677) (0.000) (0.853) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Δe t-2   0.061 -0.378**    
    [0.079] [0.165]    
      (0.444) (0.022)     
rd t-1 -0.298*** 0.307* -0.632** -0.869* -0.340***  
  [0.090] [0.181] [0.275] [0.502] [0.092]  
  (0.001) (0.091) (0.022) (0.084) (0.000)   
rd t-2   0.309 1.147**   0.417** 
    [0.278] [0.508]   [0.178] 
      (0.266) (0.024)   (0.019) 
rchf t-1 0.087 -0.007 0.802** 1.018 0.585**  
  [0.086] [0.172] [0.366] [0.681] [0.276]  
  (0.314) (0.968) (0.029) (0.135) (0.034)   
rchf t-2   -0.690** -1.031 -0.478*  
    [0.350] [0.649] [0.262]  
      (0.049) (0.112) (0.068)   
ECTD -0.02*  -0.069  -0.020*  
  [0.012]  [0.13]  [0.011]  
  (0.097)   (0.179)   (0.066)   
ECTF  -0.033**  -0.029**   -0.032** 
   [0.015]  [0.014]   [0.011] 
    (0.025)   (0.039)   (0.002) 
Arellano-Bond (1) -7.09*** -6.11*** -7.34*** -8.18*** -7.56*** -6.16***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Arellano-Bond (2) -0.28*** 1.03 -0.52 -0.52 -0.27 1.16  
 (0.000) (0.303) (0.605) (0.601) (0.789) (0.247)  
Sargan (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  
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Table 4. Estimation results - seemingly unrelated regression 
 
First lags of all 
exogenous variables 
First two lags of all 
exogenous variables General-to-specific 
 (1) (4) (2) (5) (3) (6)
  ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT 
ΔLDTt-1 0.496***  0.498*** 0.499***
  [0.085]  [0.086]  [0.086]  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
ΔLDTt-2       
        
              
ΔLFT t-1  0.449***  0.270***  0.307*** 
   [0.087]  [0.095]  [0.091] 
    (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.001) 
ΔLFT t-2  0.203**  0.315***  0.292*** 
   [0.82]  [0.089]  [0.089] 
    (0.013)   (0.000)   (0.001) 
ΔGDP t-1 1.524*** 1.187 1.295 -0.734 1.544***  
  [0.567] [0.885] [0.876] [1.552] [0.567]  
  (0.007) (0.180) (0.139) (0.636) (0.007)   
ΔGDP t-2   0.610 3.556**  2.520*** 
    [0.800] [1.403]  [0.859] 
      (0.446) (0.011)   (0.003) 
Δe t-1 0.028 -0.779*** 0.026 -0.610***  -0.649*** 
  [0.076] [0.156] [0.077] [0.152]  [0.152] 
  (0.711) (0.000) (0.736) (0.000)   (0.000) 
Δe t-2   0.035 -0.415***  -0.397** 
    [0.076] [0.158]  [0.158] 
      (0.645) (0.009)   (0.012) 
rd t-1 -0.127* 0.258* -0.594** -0.795* -0.119*  
  [0.072] [0.144] [0.257] [0.477] [0.072]  
  (0.078) (0.073) (0.021) (0.096) (0.097)   
rd t-2   0.452* 1.088  0.363*** 
    [0.252] [0.482]  [0.136] 
      (0.073) (0.024)   (0.007) 
rchf t-1 -0.045 -0.228* 0.589* 0.730   
  [0.065] [0.122] [0.347] [0.640]   
  (0.485) (0.062) (0.089) (0.254)     
rchf t-2   -0.612* -1.012  -0.280** 
    [0.333] [0.621]  [0.114] 
      (0.066) (0.103)   (0.014) 
κ -0.005 -0.022* -0.006 -0.041*** -0.004 -0.039*** 
  [0.006] [0.012] [0.007] [0.013] [0.006] [0.011] 
  (0.455) (0.063) (0.181) (0.001) (0.551) (0.001) 
Correlogram of residuals – regressions of ΔLDT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
lag AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 -0.079 -0.079 0.748 0.387 -0.092 -0.092 0.994 0.319 -0.079 -0.079 0.747 0.387 
2 -0.014 -0.020 0.770 0.680 -0.041 -0.050 1.196 0.550 -0.029 -0.035 0.846 0.655 
3 0.174 0.172 4.459 0.216 0.059 0.051 1.615 0.656 0.169 0.165 4.345 0.227 
4 0.069 0.099 5.042 0.283 -0.060 -0.052 2.047 0.727 0.067 0.096 4.898 0.298 
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Correlogram of residuals – regressions of ΔLFT 
 (4) (5) (6) 
lag AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob 
1 -0.081 -0.081 0.764 0.382 0.016 0.016 0.030 0.862 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.909 
2 -0.032 -0.038 0.883 0.643 0.038 0.037 0.197 0.906 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.991 
3 0.204 0.200 5.834 0.120 0.103 0.102 1.463 0.691 0.102 0.102 1.270 0.736 
4 0.048 0.083 6.114 0.191 -0.050 -0.055 1.760 0.780 -0.056 -0.059 1.647 0.800 
 
Table 5 – Estimation results using Arellano-Bond estimator, specification without ECT 
 
First lags of all 
exogenous variables 
First two lags of all 
exogenous variables General-to-specific 
 (1) (4) (2) (5) (3) (6) 
 ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT ΔLDT ΔLFT 
ΔLDTt-1 0.419***  0.419***  0.435***  
 [0.091]  [0.095]  [0.089]  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ΔLFT t-1  0.411***  0.221*  0.291*** 
  [0.101]  [0.114]  [0.106] 
  (0.000)  (0.051)  (0.006) 
ΔGDP t-1 1.315** 0.354 0.912 -0.644 1.349**  
 [0.588] [1.025] [0.927] [1.699] [0.584]  
 (0.025) (0.730) (0.325) (0.705) (0.021)  
ΔGDP t-2   0.626 2.836*  1.956** 
   [0.844] [1.536]  [0.979] 
   (0.458) (0.065)  (0.046) 
Δe t-1 0.032 -0.525*** 0.050 -0.343*  -0.419** 
 [0.078] [0.181] [0.083] [0.182]  [0.178] 
 (0.687) (0.004) (0.544) (0.060)  (0.019) 
Δe t-2   0.062 -0.114   
   [0.081] [0.149]   
   (0.442) (0.446)   
rd t-1 -0.197* 0.603*** -0.584** -0.839 -0.243***  
 [0.105] [0.228] [0.271] [0.524] [0.091]  
 (0.060) (0.008) (0.031) (0.109) (0.008)  
rd t-2   0.395 1.655***  0.867*** 
   [0.268] [0.567]  [0.233] 
   (0.141) (0.003)  (0.000) 
rchf t-1 -0.116 -0.710*** 0.581 0.785   
 [0.127] [0.264] [0.366] [0.703]   
 (0.358) (0.007) (0.112) (0.264)   
rchf t-2   -0.762** -1.606**  -0.787*** 
   [0.357] [0.728]  [0.264] 
   (0.033) (0.027)  (0.003) 
Arellano-Bond (1) -5.200*** -6.230*** -5.100*** -6.220*** -5.110*** -6.340*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Arellano-Bond (2) -0.730 0.820 -0.830 1.630 -0.760 1.180 
 (0.467) (0.414) (0.409) (0.104) (0.449) (0.238) 
Sargan (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
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